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Research on the industrial transition in East Germany and its outcomes has long focused on the strategy of the Treuhand­
anstalt (IHA). According to institutionalists, David Stark and Lazlo Brust!: (1998), the powerful position of the German 
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option and had good reasons to do so. Secondly, although the privatization by the 1HA resulted in the clear dominance 
of Western investors, the new ownership structure of East German industry as a whole could be characterized as a 
"capitalism without (East German) capitalists." In fact, what exists in East Germany is rather a kind of "small business 
capitalism" (KleinbetriebsknpitalifmllS) in which small-and medium-sized producers dominate the landscape. Finally, there 
was no single starting point in 1989. Two different industrial orders shaped the industrial history of the East German 
regions which were not destroyed between 1945-89, but rather transformed into the state socialist production system. It 
can be shown that these older historical patterns are relevant for transition and their outcomes as well. 
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Capitalism without Capitalists? 

A Bottom-Up View ofIndustrial Transformation in East Germany! 

Introduction 
The East German case is seldom chosen in comparative research on the transition from a 
planned economy to a capitalist one. One exception is the work of David Stark and 
Laszlo Broszt (1998), which is significant for my paper in two regards. First, their work 
succinctly expresses a widely shared top-down perspective concerning East Germany's 
transition. Second, Stark and Bruszt's work is ofparticular interest since their institutional 
pathway approach plays a considerable role in the larger field of transformation research.2 
They suggest that the set of options available for political and othc;:r actors making 
institutional and policy choices is generally constrained by the institutional legacies of the 
state-socialist past. Stark and Bruszt conceptualize such legacies as institutional resources 
which actors recombine or rearrange under new circumstances with new outcomes but 
constrained by the institutional past. With this pathway approach Stark and Broszt 
contrast the undersocialized "blue print" concept of the "shock therapy," that implies a 
sharp institutional. break. in order to implement the new, market incentives and market 
institutions (see also Stark 1995). They argue that even in the East German case of 
transformation by Unification and radical institutional transfer the specific institutional 
arrangements of the state socialist production system had shaped the way for the 
enterprise transformation that took place after 1989 in East Germany. 
According to Stark and Bruszt, the institutional arrangements m the "Weberian 
Homeland" were characterized by much weaker social networks among firms than in 
other Central- and East European societies, and the planning system and the industrial 
organization were extraordinarily centralized and hierarchical. Therefore, social networks 
The paper was first presented at the Conference "On the Road to CapitaIism-Ten Years after the 
Fall of the Berlin Wall, June 18~20, 1999," at Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, 
Harvard University, Cambridge. I am deeply indepted to Michael la Fond and. Lisa Eschenbach 
who did a great job on the English version of the paper. Special thanks to Richard Locke and 
Hiram Ramirez for their critical comments on a previous draft. 
The pathway approach is a weaker variation of the neo-institutional concept of path dependency 
that Stark applied in earlier works (Stark 1992, 1995). An instructive critique of this approach is 
offered by BeyerlWielgohs 1998. 
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could easily be destroyed after Gennan Unification by "market shock" and the top-down 
method of privatization and restructuring carried out by the Treuhandanstalt (THA). 
Moreover, because of the intact centralized plarming system it could easily be replaced by 
another centralized and cohesive administrative apparatus, now backed by the strong 
West German state. Although the THA-after facing increasing difficulties in finding 
western investors-organized deliberations with regional governments, unions and trade 
associations, these new "deliberative networks" remained artificial and without a vibrant 
associational life at the enterprise-level. As a result, the THA's top-down orchestrated 
transition resulted primarily in the creation of new western subsidiaries. Moreover, these 
transplants were seen as integrated into the networks of their western parent companies. 
Consequently, there seems to be little support for the revival of the eastern economy and 
for the development of vibrant networks. This type of firm-region relationship is often 
described as "cathedrals in the desert. II For the East German social structure this finding 
would mean a kind of "capitalism without (East German) capitalists" (StarkIBruszt, 1998: 
140-142, 159, 163; Grabher, 1994: 192-193; LangelPugh, 1998: 83V 
In contrast to this approach, I argue that the East German case of enterprise 
transformation-like all the other cases in Central- and Eastern Europe-can only be 
understood by combining both perspectives, the top-down and the bottom-up view. 
Without a bottom-up perspective we dramatically misinterpret the starting point, the 
internal dynamics of the restructuring process and even the results of this process. 
Moreover, a bottom-up view reveals that the German case fits much less into the 
framework of the pathway approach and in the comparative concept based on this 
approach. It should, however, not lead one to exclude the German case from the 
comparison. In fact, the German case demonstrates how historical legacies can be 
influential inspite of radical institutional breaks. 
In Part One, I will outline the institutional starting point in East Germany. This system 
has been insufficiently described as having been purely hierarchical and governed by an 
efficient, highly centralized planning bureaucracy. In fact, as in other planned economies 
Stark and Bruszt claim that in contrast to the weak East German social networks, Hungarian firms 
bad developed dense subcontracting networks that were provoked by the economic reforms in the 
1970s and 1989s, and therefore after 1989 they were able to recombine and strengthen enterprise­
to-enterprise ties through the creation of cross-ownership. Even the Czech Industrial Associations 
(VHJ), which were organized mainly along branch or regional lines at the meso level, were found 
to be more strongly embedded than the East German state enterprises in dense social and regional 
networks. After 1989, these Czech networks were not dissolved but transformed into rich new 
networks among banks, investment funds and enteIprises by direct ownership connections 
(StarklBruszt, 1998: 163-165; Stark 1996; Grabher, 1994; 1995). 
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the fonnal production and governance system had its flip-side and only functioned when 
actors created informal networks and bargained to solve problems. Although these 
informal relationships deviated from official structures, they enabled the centralized 
system to exist as long as it did. In addition, the industrial Kombinate were not 
established on a "tabula rasa" but were based on different industrial orders that long 
preceded the state socialist system. These historical patterns influenced the construction 
of industrial organization after 1945 and reveal remarkable differences in structures. 
In Part Two, I argue that the top-down process of breaking up conglomerates into small 
productive pieces and privatizing them was only part of the story. The disaggregation 
policy organized by the THA from above after 1989, was accompanied by a radical 
dissolution of the inter-organizational relations at the company and plant level. The 
motivation for this behavior lies not in weaker industrial networks. but rather in the 
specific constraints and opportunities that emerged following the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and German Unification. 
Finally, in Part Three I argue that an over emphasis of the THA's role as the main actor 
leads to erroneous results that equate the Treuhand-privatization with the results of 
enterprise transfonnation. Such a top-down approach in the industrial sector fails to 
recognize that the results of this process are not the dominance of western owners and 
subsidiaries, but rather a dominance of smaller businesses. East German industry today 
should not to be characterized as a "capitalism without East German capitalists" but rather 
as a "small business capitalism" (Kleinbetriebskapitalismus) in which small- and 
medium-sized producers and their challenges dominate the scene. 
Part One: A State Socialist Production System with Different 
Regional Industrial Orders 
Two main points need to be considered with a bottom-up perspective of the East German 
state socialist production system, focusing on real-existing structures and relationships 
instead of ideal, formal models. 
First, as in other centralized planning bureaucracies, the East Gennan production and 
governance system was an embedded one with extensive infonnal bargaining and 
networking within and between the production and planning units. There existed in the 
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plants or production units unspoken contracts mainly between blue collar workers and 
management. My colleagues and I have called this arrangement Planerfiillungspakt 
(VoskamplWittke, 1991; Bluhm, 1991). Faced with regular disturbances in the 
production flow because of defective machines or shortages in materials, successful plan 
realization greatly depended on the willingness of blue collar workers to rescue the plan 
at the end of the month or year, for example by working on weekends and putting in 
overtime when the material and/or machine problems were solved. Moreover, all 
employees were virtually unfireable, and there was a cronic shortage of blue collar 
workers. Thus, blue collar workers in particular, had a kind of "passive strength" in their 
daily informal bargaining with the managers over plan realization, wages and control over 
working hours.4 
Bargaining among firms was often in the form of informal material and service networks 
based on personal relationships, that served to correct for supply imbalances and 
shortages. Reciprocal support was practiced for example, with various accounting 
maneuvers that made up for the differences between planned and actual produced goods 
(Marz, 1991, 1992; Heidenreich, 1991). Although the East German shadow economy was 
not developed to the extent of being an independent sector as in other planned economies, 
informal networks infiltrated the whole system, and were in fact a functional part of the 
system. The uniqueness of the East German economic transition is not the unusual 
weakness ofpre-1989 informal networks but rather in their rapid disappearance. 
Second, Kombinate differed not only according to the particularities of the various 
industrial branches, but also these large conglomerates were built on different regional 
traditions of industrial development. The East German state was not able to cleanly or 
.. 	 An important indicator of such informal bargaining over wages and output is that the planning 
administration in the GDR had not been able to control the wage increases, especially of the blue­
collar workers. For example, the intended differences among gross earnings of wage groups were 
often undermined and ended up favoring the lower wage groups as enterprises paid extraordinary 
bonuses. Bonuses were only detennined by the state enterprises (VEBI Kombinate), and in this 
way managers had a flexible instrument in their hands to increase labor earnings according the 
objectives of plan realization (Stephan/Wiedemann, 1991: 553). One additional instrument to 
increase the reserve funds for internal wage bargaining was to create so called "dead souls " (tote 
See/en): employees who did not actually work there but for whom the enterprise received money_ 
"In this way Kombinate had wage funds which not only secured the payment of all workers as 
needed to carry-out a given plan, but also to pay for overtime, shifts on Sundays and public 
holidays, and to increase the average wages of the enterprise; that is the second foundation of 
future wage funds planning (Kusch et al., 1991)." Such methods, and also the unequal taxes for 
workers and service employees, led to the well known min:inrizing of differences in earnings, 
partly politically desired, but partly as a consequence of the worker revolt in 1953. After 1953, the 
government did not want to provoke workers by wage cuts or increasing labor intensitiy anymore 
(see StephanlWiedemann, 1991; Winkler, 1990; and Kusch et aI., 1991). 
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easily supplant these traditions with their state-socialist production model after 1949. 
Since these traditions have also influenced the industrial reorganization after 1990 and 
since they are still less understood as the informal flip-side of the planned economy, I will 
go into some more detail here. I refer to Gary Herrigel's work in this area, who has 
studied the history of German industrialization and its two parallel patterns of productive 
organization and governance. He characterizes these patterns as forms of industrial order, 
which have shaped German regions more according to a North-South axis than an East­
West one (Herrigel, 1996). 
Prior to 1945, the substantial chemical industry of Sachsen-Anhalt (a past Prussian 
province) was deeply shaped by an autarchic form of industrial order: simply stated, all 
aspects of production and its governance were entirely embedded within the institutional 
framework of large firms. Large mass production plants were founded by big German 
corporations within poor, agricultural regions that were relatively free of preindustrial 
handicraft infrastructures. Such mass producers were vertically integrated and organized 
most supplies and services in house. After 1945, these organizational structures were 
easily adapted to the centralized state-socialist model with its inherent tendency toward 
self-sufficient production, vertical integration and autarchy. In 1989, for instance, the 
Kombinat Leuna-one of the three Kombinate of Sachsen-Anhalt's so-called "Chemical­
Triangle"-encompassed only two Volkseigene Betriebe (VEB, or People's Enterprises) 
with about 30,000 employees. About 27,000 of these workers were concentrated in one 
single plant, 10,000 of whom worked in services and technical fields not directly related 
to the chemical branch, including machine and freight car production facilities -that were 
in existence before 1945 (VoskamplBluhmlWittke, 1993). 
Southern parts of Saxony and Thuringia, like Baden-WUrttemberg, were on the other 
hand, characterized by specialized small- and medium-sized producers in diverse 
branches, situated in urban centers as well as smaller cities and communities, and 
supported by a variety of regional public institutions and associations. After 1945, this 
decentralized regional order was successively, but not entirely restructured by the state 
socialist production system. The three following phenomena illustrate that the regional, 
decentralized industrial order was not completely obliterated: 
a) Until 1972, when the last phase ofnationalization was implemented, a large number of 
small- and medium-sized producers in Thuringia and Saxony were able to maintain an 
existence outside the state's centrally planned industrial organization, surviving as 
partially nationalized or as cooperative companies. Compared to other regions, Saxony 
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was able to sustain for a long time multiple and varied forms of property ownership 
(Bramke et al. 1994). And, even after having their property dispossessed in 1972, many 
business people and their offspring stayed on in their former firms as managers and 
engineers. 
b) Even after the complete establishment of the state~socialist production system in 1972, 
the decentralized industrial structures did not vanish. Although decision~making was 
centralized, the specialized and dispersed production organizations were not concentrated 
nor were they strictly organized according to the principles of economy of scale and 
vertical integration. In fact, the enormous size of some VEB, like in Saxony's textile 
industry, was due to aggregated figures that masked the actual Kombinate structure. Two 
examples help to illustrate this argument: 
• 	 The VEB VERGO, a subsidiary of a textiles Kombinat, had about 3,700 employees, a 
typical number for a large state enterprise. Yet, VEB VERGO encompassed four 
plants located in four different small towns and communities throughout Saxony. And 
they in turn were geographically spread across 24 production sites. One of these plants 
had 211 employees and was divided into three locations, and another of these plants 
with 560 employees had five production units in different locations. 
• 	 The Cotton Kombinat--with nearly 70,000 employees the largest conglomerate of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR)-was divided into 27 state enterprises or VEB. 
These enterprises were, however, divided into 215 plants, 236 production sites and 76 
still smaller production units. Besides a few large units, the VEB were mainly 
dispersed into organizational units with less than 500 employees (see Bluhm, 1999).5 
Sometimes, the spartial dispersion and heterogeneity in products were so high that the 
production units could hardly be governed by a single centralized office. Therefore the 
Kombinate structure-established in the late 60s and 70s-had to be adapted to the 
residual decentral order. Larger VEB within specialized small~ and medium-sized 
industries were declared a kind of sub-leadership unit that comprised specialized groups 
of manufacturers (Leitbetrieb). Whereas most Kombinate were governed by one, large 
anchor manufacturing enterprise with planning and controlling responsibilities 
(Stammbetrieb) (Gomer, 1989: 72-73). 
The East Gennan textile and clothing industry manufactured its products for the Soviet Union, the 
western markets and the domestic market. With around 300,000 employees it was one of the 
largest industries in East Gennany before 1989. After the nearly immediate loss of all three 




The legacies of the historically decentralized order shaped the structure of Kombinate 
even in industries that were not as dispersed as the textile and clothing industry. For 
instance, the Kombinate of Saxony's tool and textile machine industry were essentially an 
assemblage of the different specialized manufacturers and some, but not all suppliers. The 
vertical integration of those Kombinate was far less developed than the concept implies. 
Each enterprise had its own product that generally predated 1945. 
c) The state socialist production system did not destroy the given regional clustering of 
many producers and their various supply and service industries. Rather it preserved and 
strengthened the existing regional density with the expansion of production for the Soviet 
market. One impressive example of the high degree of clustering was the Chemnitz (alias 
Karl-Marx-Stadt) region-a center for the machine tool, textile machine, textile and car 
components industries, whose supplier relations were primarily regionally-based. Five 
Kombinate had their headquarters and main departments in Karl-Marx-Stadt as well as 
their industrial research centers.6 Traditionally there were close relations between the 
regionally-oriented textile and textile machine industries in areas of research and 
development. Also in this region was the machine tool Kombinat "Fritz Heckert," that 
had a good working relationship with the Karl-Marx-Stadt Technical University that itself 
had a large machine tool institute (this in addition to the Kombinat's own R&D Center 
with 1,600 employees). A close cooperation between industry and the university was not 
only part of the planning system but was also supported by institutional and personal ties. 
For example the Fritz Heckert Kombinat's general director was also a member of the 
University rector's advisory council. Important suppliers belonging to other industrial 
groups were also located in and around the traditional industrial center of Karl-Marx­
Stadt. This geographic proximity also enabled the emergence of dense regional informal 
networks among producers of both similar and differing industries as well as between 
industry and the various research institutes concentrated here. 
In summary, Kombinate were to varying degrees vertically integrated. Behind the mode! 
of an autarchic, centralized 'bureaucratic production model we find remarkable variations 
in organizational structure that can be traced back to diverging historical origins and 
industrial orders. Whereas after 1945, the autarchic firm-based order of mass production 
could often be smoothly integrated into the state socialist production, the decentralized 
order presented some challenges. Thus, the state-socialist production system was not able 
to completely set aside the traditionally decentralized and dispersed organization of 
In no other town of the GDR were there so many producers of investment goods as in Karl-Marx· 
Stadt (Chemnitz). 43.6 percent of the working inhabitants were employed in such industries, 
8 

production in Saxony and Thuringia, but rather had to work with and incorporate these 
traditional structures. Obviously after 1989, there was not just one starting point in East 
Germany for enterprise transformation, but rather different starting points based on 
historical lines that were much older than the state socialist system. We will see that this 
influenced the results of the industrial transformation in East Germany. 
Part Two: Dissolution From Below 
Enterprise transformation encompasses various processes, some of which occur 
simultaneously and others step by step, including reconfiguration, corporatization, 
privatization of assets, and internal reorganization. Reconfiguration is the redefining of 
boundaries of various economic units, and a redistribution of their resources. 
Corporatization is the legal conversion of state enterprises or their units into private 
companies, which generally speaking precedes a privatization of assets and liabilities. 
The process of corporatization in Central and Eastern Europe is often equated with 
commercialization, which I assume to be more precisely related to the transition to 
market-based, commercial relationships. With regard to internal reorganization I am 
referring to the internal organizational change and adaptation to the market environment 
that is not simply solved with the establishment ofprivate ownership control. 
A common interpretation of the East German case is that the THA had through a series of 
planned steps from above, disbanded and divided up the state Kombinate in order to sell 
them off to western investors. While this interpretation speaks of the THA as a powerful 
and forceful bureaucratic "superagent" we learn little about other possible actors-above 
all the behavior and attitudes of managers and employees. Certainly, East German 
managers possessed less power to influence the privatization process in comparison with 
their colleagues in Hungary, the Czech Republic or Poland. It would, however, be wrong 
to rule East German managers and employees out as actors in the transformation of their 
enterprises. A closer look at the role of East German managers (and often supported by 
worker representatives) leads to the astonishing observation that these actors from below 
seldom tried to resist the THAIs deconstruction of their industrial groups. Moreover, these 
actors independently worked toward some of the same objectives as the THA, and acted 
in this way according to their own interests. I am convinced that the high speed of the 
dissolution from below in East Gennany cannot be explained by historically weak social 
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networks, as the institutional pathway approach would suggest. Nor can this dissolution 
be explained by a radically market-oriented mentality that the East Germans adopted as 
latecomers to the stage of reforms and restructurings. Most importantly, there were actual 
opportunities and constraints that had encouraged managers and worker representatives to 
act rationally when they chose the exit-option. The following three phenomena 
characterize the dissolution from below: 
a) Autonomization of single enterprises or plants with respect to their former 
conglomerates (regarding decision-making hierarchies) 
b) Vertical rearrangements with respect to former suppliers and service units (regarding 
vertical inter-firm relations) 
c) The breakdown of communication between firms (both in horizontal and vertical 
relations). 
I argue that we must consider these phenomena in order to adequately comprehend the 
rapid speed of the East German industrial dissolution and the limited resistance of 
managers and workers to the THA politics of disaggregation. 
a) Autonomization 
Autonomization is the process of setting enterprise units (firm, plant, department or 
production unit) free from their former subordinate positions within hierarchical 
structures. This process began in East Germany long before the THA started with its 
programs of disaggregation and privatization. In the early stage of transition at the end of 
1989 and the beginning of 1990, managers who were unsatisfied with the subordinate role 
of their plants wanted to improve the position of their plant or enterprise within the old 
state conglomerates (Le. to increase their budgets and gain influence). The 
Autonomization process picked up speed, and after a short time, the managers recognized 
that they were facing not only system reforms but a fundamental system change. 
Corporatization was begun during the period of the original THA, founded on March I, 
1990, by the Hans Modrow Administration, before the first and last free election of the 
parliament in the GDR. Corporatization measures were to have been finished before the 
GEMSU of July I, 1990, but ultimately lasted into the Fall of 1990 (see FischerlSchroter. 




privatization and disaggregation of the conglomerates, nor concerning the shape of their 
own eventual organizational structure. The decision for a rapid privatization was made 
with the refonned Treuhand Act in June, 1990, by the newly elected GDR Christian 
Democratic government. But even then, the fmal organizational concept with which the 
THA was to work was not yet detennined. The Union Treaty that was signed on August 
31, 1990, by both eastern and western governments, still outlined the creation of five 
branch-based Treuhand joint stock companies to manage the privatization and 
restructuring process. Yet, the plan was soon set aside by the President of the THA, 
Detlev K. Rohwedder, who had always criticized the planned joint stock companies. 
Instead, a central administration was established with specialized Treuhand directorates. 
These directorates only began their work at the end 1990.7 Evidence shows that the 
transfonnation process was already underway by the time the THA intervened. 
I think it is important to note that local decision-makers had to face some issues regarding 
the corporatization efforts that the state enterprises had begun to prepare for in February 
and March of 1990: 
First, should the Kombinate be dissolved or transfonned into large holdings or joint stock 
companies? This was primarily a decision dealt with by Kombinat directors, who with 
few exceptions wanted to keep their conglomerates together. 
Second, should the individual state enterprises (VEB) follow the Kombinat management 
into the joint stock company or holding, or should they pursue separate corporatization as 
limited liability companies directly controlled by the THA? This was above all a decision 
for the VEB to make for themselves. 
I have analyzed how these decisions were made according to three branches: machine 
construction, the textile and clothing industry, and a part of the chemical industry that 
specialized in more refined customer-oriented products and that involved a number of 
VEB·s in urban areas (Bluhm, 1999). In all three branches that I examined, there was a 
clear preference of the state enterprises for a corporatization as a single company under 
the direction of the THA, as opposed to remaining in the conglomerate. Hence, the 
substance of the newly founded joint stock companies was often already undennined 
from below before the THA had started to disaggregate them. For example, the machine 
Rohwedder, former top-manager of the Hoesch AG, was murdered in April 1991, as the last 
victim of the German terrorist orgaIrization RAF. His successor would be the Christian 
Democratic politician Birgit Breuel. For more on the history of the TIiA see Fischer! Schroter. 
1993; Freese, 1995, Kemmler, 1994; Seibel/Kapferer, 1993. 
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tool Kombinat "Fritz Heckert" consisted of21 VEBs at the end of 1989, but only eight of 
them followed the Kombinat management into a strategic holding, and another 13 
reorganized themselves as separate companies under Treuhand management. Among the 
13 were the Fritz Heckert R&D Center and the Kombinatsstammbetrieb-the anchor 
enterprise-which gave, the industrial group its very name. With 4,300 employees this 
VEB was the "flagship" of the East Gennan machine tool industry and the largest 
manufacturer of its kind in the GDR. Meanwhile, in the transformation of another 
machine tool Kombinat, the "7th of Oktober, " 16 VEB followed the management into an 
ambitious Itstrategic holding," and nine enterprises eventually decided to go their own 
way. However, even those state-owned enterprises that were integrated into the large 
holdings looked out for themselves. They asked the THA to directly manage some of the 
company shares so that the enterprises would not fall exclusively under the control of the 
holding (THA, 1994: 1053). 
Comparable scenaries could be observed in other industries as well, such as the 
pharmaceutical industry, where the management of its Kombinatsstammbetrieb had 
selected an exit-option already in the early spring of 1990. The two other large 
manufacturers of this Kombinat went the same way. Altogether, these three plants 
produced 80 percent of the total of the East Gennan pharmaceutical industry. Here only 
four of the former 17 VEB joined the new large holding. In spite of this, the Kombinat 
management initially went forward with the ambitious plan of forming an internationally 
operating corporation and found support for this from a prominent West Gennan 
consulting firm (Bluhm, 1999: 70-71; SchliitterlBeilicke, 1993: 210-211). Since one of its 
most important plants had already in February and March of 1990 switched its strategy 
from upgrading within the group-hierarchy toward gaining fully autonomous status, the 
top-management of the GDR's only cosmetic Kombinat failed to fonn a holding. For this 
Kombinat there was not even a fonnal founding of a new holding company. The 
Treuhand manager responsible for this industry noted that this conglomerate fell apart 
literally "over nighttl (Bredereck 1993: 298). Yet, the fastest decay of the conglomerates 
occurred in the textile and clothing industry, where many of the newly founded holdings 
or joint stock companies came apart even before 1990 was over.8 
Many Kombinat directors founded employer's associations in order to find more market­
responsive methods to hold their groups together and to fuid new job perspectives for themselves. 
Yet, faced with the massive decline of the textile and clothing industry and under the influence of 
the West German textile industry employer's association, most of these associations merged step 
by step to eventually become one single, quite efficient association (Bluhm, 1999: 237-240). 
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The decomposition processes of the large conglomerates were influenced by their specific 
historical roots. For instance, Kombinate with substantial structural and organizational 
legacies of the past decentralized industrial order were easier to dissolve since the spatial 
dispersion of the productive capacities and organizational units fostered an easy 
redefinition of organizational lines after 1989. In addition, the relatively weak vertical 
integration of more specialized manufacturers also did little to hinder their 
disaggregation. It is remarkable that resistance to the dissolution of conglomerates only 
really surfaced in those industries where conglomerates mainly consisted of one large 
enterprise. More precisely, this concerned resistance to the THA's plans to separate single 
large finns, and not the breaking down of conglomerates as such.9 Hence, we can confinn 
that the older industrial legacies had influenced the enterprise transfonnation at that stage 
by opening up strategic options that then fostered a dissolution from below. The past 
decentralized regional order however, did not trigger this behavior at the plant or state 
enterprise level. 
Decisive for the behavior of managers and other actors with bottom-up perspectives was 
the specific situation in which they saw greater advantage in choosing the exit-option and 
more risk in staying within their conglomerate structure. I identify three primary 
arguments for the selection of the exit-option: 
First, autonomization seemed to improve the chances for managers to remain in their 
positions. Faced with enonnous restructuring measures, they had to fear that Komhinat 
directors would attempt to make changes in management staff. The exit-option was thus 
seen as a way of impeding an organizational restructuring strategy that might begin by 
shifting or letting go of lower level managers. 
The second and more important argument concerns the high risks and costs of the 
dramatic changes the conglomerates were facing. In other words: to restructure within a 
conglomerate or holding meant that the cost of the market adjustment would be 
The Kombinat Buna, ~ne of the three large enterprises of the chemical industry in Saxony-Anhalt 
was thus able to resist the Treuhand strategy of breaking down different divisions into privatizable 
independent units, while the infrastructure would be managed by a special service company. This 
industrial park concept was realized in Leuna and Wolfen-Bitterfeld, while the TIiA had to 
develop new privatizing concepts for Buna as a whole fum. Managers and worker representatives 
in the former Kombinat "Ernst Thalmann" in Magdeburg acted similarly, and were for a long time 
successful in blocking the disaggregation concepts of the THA, only giving up after a long fight 
and clearly failing at the markets. Yet, also in this case, the conflict, while it arose upon the 
conglomerate as a whole, mainly concerned the enterprise in Magdeburg itself, regarding the 




distributed among the units and according to strategies for the conglomerate as a whole. 
With many state enterprises, managers and worker representatives as well were afraid of 
absorbing overhead and extra transformation costs due to necessary adjustments of other 
less profitable units in their conglomerate. Thus, both managers and worker 
representatives saw better odds in taking on the new challenges as part of smaller 
independent units, and so were unwilling to be involved in the restructuring of all the 
other units in a conglomerate. Therefore it was not only unattractive for them to stay in 
their industrial groups, it was also seen to be quite risky. Profit-and-Ioss transfer 
agreements that were to be signed with the new holding companies underlined this risk, 
whereas the benefit in staying in the old conglomerate was expected to be less. The old 
conglomerates, were among other reasons, not so attractive as they were strictly 
production-oriented and as was the case of smaller enterprises found themselves 
newcomers in the vital areas of marketing and distribution. Under state-socialist 
conditions, such functions were separated from the industrial Kombinate, and were 
generally concentrated in Berlin. Moreover, from March of 1990 onward, and especially 
after the GEMSU, many firms began to expect that a rapid privatization would solve their 
marketing problems. Incentive for staying with a larger conglomerate was further 
whittled away as the formerly powerful Kombinat directors had already lost most of their 
political influence. 
Third, actors at the enterprise level (Le. managers and worker representatives) were 
generally correct in their belief that the founding oflegally independent companies would 
improve the chances of finding a western investor. As independent companies they would 
also have more influence on the privatization process and the search for investors. By the 
summer of 1990, many managers of state enterprises had already begun this search for 
western capital and partners for joint ventures, participating in what was becoming a mass 
phenomenon. In other words, the political decisions concerning the path of the transition 
in 1990 had shaped the strategic options of local actors well before the THA actually 
went into action as the restructurer ofconglomerates. 
b) Vertical Rearrangement 
During the process of enterprise transformation not only the hierarchical decision-making 
structures were reorganized but also the vertical relations between suppliers and 
manufacturers, both internal and external to the former conglomerates. The sudden 




many eastern producers a nearly fatal blow, as from one day to the next they facec 
dramatically different production costs, even though they were still manufacturing the 
same products with the same productivity levels. These new conditions generatec 
tremendous competitive challenges, and fostered an abrupt vertical rearrangement alon§ 
value-added production chains. The manufacturers at the end of the chain rapidl) 
instituted western standards (in quality and prices) and passed them down to theil 
suppliers. Often, these suppliers were not able to meet the new demands. As a result, the) 
were forced out of the chain since it was relatively easy for manufacturers to replace them 
with new western suppliers. This was possible since the GEMSU allowed easy access tc 
western market alternatives. Hence, in contrast to other post-socialist economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the vertical rearrangement was radical and happened very 
quickly. Moreover, long-term relationships, like R&D-cooperation, could hardly survive 
the GEMSU and the political orientation of rapid privatization. After the currency and 
economic union, most of the East German producers had become dependent on liquidity 
credits paid as subsidies by the THA. The relations among firms as well as research 
institutions suffered from the great uncertainties regarding the future. This contributed to 
a collapse of long-term relationships and a dramatic "de-clustering" of supplier and 
service relations. 10 
I conclude, as do Stark and Bruszt, that the "market shock" had indeed fostered a vertical 
disintegration even before privatization measures were actually implemented. However, it 
is a mistake to assume-as the pathway approach does-that the high speed of 
disaggregation would have been much different had the previous supplier-producer 
relationships been organized via stronger subcontracting relations and not as they were 
The dissolution of the former supplying relations was so dramatic that in 1991, IG Metall, the 
local union of the metal- and electric industry in Chemnitz, organized a car rally of its members in 
order to demonstrate for the industrial products of this region, and to demand that local rums 
remember their former local suppliers: just as East Gennan consumers were asked to remember 
the regionally produced consumer goods (Interview. 5.10. 1994. K.B.; 10 MetaIJ, 1993). The 
employer's association of the East German textile and clothing industry (vti) in 1994 organized a 
"day for internal cooperation" to revitalize the contacts between East German firms (horizontaIly 
and vertically). Here the president of the East German textile and clothing association appealed to 
the member-rums: "Due to the fundamental structural and economic changes in the East German 
textile and clothing industry, breaks are being observed in many of the former cooperative 
relationships among enterprises ....however a great advantage for the East German economy and 
its enterprises could be cooperation among the great range of the textile branches in connection 
with the proximity to the markets ofall of the partners in the textile production chain .... So we see 
that in West Germany the enterprises have enjoyed success for many years through such 
cooperative relationships of partners that are 'just down the street.' And this helps to explain the 
higher ability of West Gennan producers to 'add value' to their goods. Let us use this model of 
cooperation as an example for our own efforts (Heindorf, 1994). It 
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via the centrally planned economic system. Here it is important to note that even stronger 
subcontracting relations would have been subjected to the dramatic competiti ve pressures 
and rapidly changing commercialized relations such as new cost systems, and would have 
had the same deficits regarding product quality, flexibility and productivity. 
The reasons for a delay of the dissolution of fonner supplier-producer relations were 
usually technological or technical in nature, but even then only when a substitution of 
new trade partners would lead to costly adaptations and adjustments. However, this was 
only a serious impediment when managers did not expect a rapid improvement of their 
competitive capabilities. That replacing suppliers would lead to technological 
adjustments did not by itself hinder managers when they hoped that this would quickly 
take them up to western standards. Quite often managers incorrectly equated such an 
achievement ofwestern product quality with an ability to compete in western markets. 
c) Communicative Closure 
The characteristic behavior of East Gennan enterprise managers concerning changes in 
hierarchy, customer-supplier relations or R&D cooperation can be explained as the 
strategic choices of actors who reacted to new constraints and at the same time also tried 
to estimate or calculate their risks and advantages under great uncertainty. Not only such 
"hard" business relationships were broken off but also the "soft," communicative, inter­
:finn relationships. Observers with direct experience in the mediation of industrial, inter­
:finn relations offered the following comments concerning this phenomenon that 1 have 
called kommunikative SchliefJung (communicative closure): 
"In the first two and a half years or so they [the managers - K.B.] did not speak to each other: 
they saw each other as the worst ofenemies (Interview. 4.30.96. K.B.)." 
"There was the belief that, now we finally have the free entrepreneurship and every one can 
venture out into the market. And then no one wanted to share information anymore. The new 
principle was: of course no one wants to help their competitor get ahead (Interview. 4.11.96. 
KB.)." 
Such a crumbling of the fonnerly loose inter-organizational relations, before many 
enterprises were privatized, is hard to explain within the framework of the pathway 
approach. Indeed this approach can only explain the East Gennan behavior by claiming 
that the fonner social networks among state enterprises were so weak that they could not 




managers were over-reacting to the previously planned and forced division of labor, and 
so dramatically overstressed the new opportunities they saw in competitive markets. The 
conversion of formerly cooperative enterprises into fierce competitors and the new 
wariness of opportunistic behavior seems to confirm this position which is articulated in 
the German literature. II Nevertheless, the phenomenon of communicative closure does 
not readily match this interpretation either, because of its paradoxical character. Another 
interview revealed: 
"It was a paradox: there were a lot of conferences with western companies at that time, whereby 
they (East Gennans) spoke quite openly with the West German firms, but would not talk with 
their own neighbors. They were astonished afterwards when they found out that other West 
German firms knew all about their situations as welL. And so they caught on that they [western 
finns] talked with each other too (Interview. 4.30.96. K.B.)." 
In other words: this behavior was specifically directed against other East German firms, 
that is to say against the formerly well-known and trusted organizational environment. In 
comparison, communication and even the willingness to cooperate and to give up the 
newly gained autonomy was very high toward West German firms, at least at the 
beginning of the transformation process. While fear of opportunistic behavior from 
former East "neighbors" was high, there seemed to be less concern about such behavior 
coming from western firms. In other words: they trusted the unknown but mistrusted the 
known. 
And this paradox goes deeper. Kombinate were organized in such a way that each had 
their own product specialization, and there were actually few enterprises that had 
manufactured the same products. In the early stage of transformation this underlying 
labor division continued. Yet, eastern managers started to perceive each other as fierce 
competitors, even when their enterprises were not competitors in the product market. A 
representative of the chemical industry trade association describes this behavior: 
"People stayed close together around the time of the border-opening and reunification. It was 
unclear what changes were just ahead, and then somehow it all collapsed. We had a hard time 
really comprehending that since it took place outside of the association ...Then came the time, 
when the enterprises didn't speak with each other, because they saw each other as competitors, 
but in reality they were anything but direct competitors (Interview. 10.17.96. K.B.)." 
Identifying the overly rigorous market-orientation of newly transformed East German 
managers does not seem to be enough to explain these curious cuts in communication. In 
this case the definition of who presented a competitive threat would have to be both more 
Arguing similarly are for example: Rachel et aI., 1993; Claus, 1996, Treichel et a1.. 1993. 
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tmiversal (i.e. do western finns also offer competitive threats?), and more accurate with 
regards to the difference between real competitors concerning product markets and those 
(eastern) finns which were not direct competitors in product markets. The paradox of 
one-sided commtmicative closure must be observed in connection with the enterprise 
transformation itself. I see three possible interpretations: 
First, the commtmication cuts might be interpreted as an effect of disassociation. This 
argument suggests that an enterprise was to be understood as self-reliant and in clear 
separation from fonner organizational connections. Thus, transfonnation meant that firms 
would have to create their own, new organizational identity and do so by drawing new 
lines of demarcation-especially between themselves and those organizations which they 
were formerly associated with. The communicative closure was therefore directed toward 
the "neighbors" or the other members of the fonner Kombinate, and was felt to be 
necessary as long as the new organizational or finn boundaries were considered to be 
uncertain by the actors. As one of my interviewees said: "First you have to build the 
fence, then you can open the door." As long as the new finns had not yet established 
themselves as serious market contenders, and consolidated as organizations, external 
commtmication was closed or limited with respect to the fonner organizational 
environment. 
Second, the astonishing openness to western, mostly West German firms-even when 
they were direct competitors on the product markets-can be explained by the high 
expectations or hopes of profitable cooperation with these western finns. Moreover, East 
Gennan :finns saw western companies primarily as potential investors which one needed 
to impress. The more difficult it became to find investors, the more obvious it became 
that there were far more eastern finns seeking western investors than vice versa. Investors 
were a scarce good and were thus able to choose among a number of competing offers. 
From this point of view the curious competitive behavior of East German firms against 
other East firms, even when they were not direct competitors, is rational. It is also much 
clearer why East German firms underestimated the opportunism of West German firms, 
while they overestimated the opportunism of former fellow enterprises. East German 
firms were indeed real competitors--if not on the product market then on the privatizing 
market-where they collectively offered a large supply of productive capacities but were 
met with weak demand. Hence, there were few incentives to Itshow one's cards" to other 
eastern companies who were also looking for western capital and know-how, and access 
to new markets. Western firms, in contrast, appeared on the privatization market as 




information even to their western market competitors. Product and privatizing markets 
therefore represented rather divergent demands and risks for the management of the East 
German firms. East German managers· were thus completely surprised by the 
opportunistic behavior of West German firms which sometimes preferred for instance to 
simply take advantage of the company's lists of customers rather than get involved in the 
risky venture of restructuring. 
Here lies the implicit argument that the isolation of East German firms and their one­
sided communicative closure with respect to their previously familiar environment is 
neither purely the result of fixed institutional aspects of the transformation, nor is it due 
to fixed ideologies. Instead, I argue here that the communication cuts are to be explained 
by the actual changing environmental conditions and as an integral part of a dynamic 
learning process. 
Part Three: Revisiting the Results of the East German 
Transformation 
A top-down perspective that narrowly focuses on the THA as the central actor 0 f 
restructuring and privatizing in the East German transformation typically overlooks the 
contribution of actors from below and identifies the results of the enterprise 
transformation with the outcomes of the Treuhand-privatization. 1l I have argued in this 
paper that the transformation of the large conglomerates into private companies was not 
totally controlled and directed by the THA. Though there is little doubt that the THA was 
a central actor in this process, the high speed of disaggregation would not be 
understandable without respect to the activities from below. These actors partially reacted 
to new conditions and alternatives in the product markets, but also calculated the 
opportunities and constraints ofthe situation as a whole. 
In addition, since enterprise transformation was not simply a passing of enterprise control 
from state to private hands, but also a reconfiguration of an enterprise's productive 
capacities and resources, it is necessary to consider the creation of ~ firms as a 
Not only do Stark and Brustz argue this way, but also other authors like Lange und Pugh ( 1998): 
"East Germany has ... been assimilated into Gennan capitalism but lacks a substantial capitalist 
class," tracing this back to the "top-down method of privatization ... that mainly created 
subsidiaries ofWest German companies, and tended to exclude East Germans (83-84)." 
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Such regional variations can be attributed to traditional patterns of industrial orders that 
do not determine the regional prospectives but shape opportunities and constraints for 
actors in different ways. In contrast to the legacy of the autarkic, firm-centered industrial 
order, the legacy of the decentralized industrial order fosters the (re)establislunent of 
inter-organizational relationships in a number ofways: 
First, in Saxony like in the smaller Thuringia, the Itcritical mass" of potential cooperative 
partners is considerably greater than in the regions of Brandenburg or Saxony-Anhalt 
Even in comparison to West German Lander the density of enterprises in Saxony is not as 
low as normally expected in East Germany. As Table 5 "and 6 reveal, Saxony is ranked 
sixth among the 16 German Lander in respect to the number of enterprises; Thuringia is 
eighth, Saxony-Anhalt is ranked tenth, followed by Brandenburg and Berlin (including 
Berlin-West). Moreover, Saxony in particular maintains a diversity ofbranches, suppliers 
and producers in automobile, machine, microelectronics and textile industries, and as a 
region offers a wide-range ofopportunities for inter-firm cooperation. 
In addition, Saxony has been quite succesfull in attracting new green-field investments. 
One of the most important investors is the car producer Volkswagen in Zwickau and the 
U.S. electronic company AMD in Dresden. The former headquarters of the micro­
electronic Kombinat Robotron was in Dresden, and the city was able to beat out Frankfurt 
an der Oder (Brandenburg) in the competition for new investors in this industry. While 
Brandenburg could not prevent the demise of its micro-electronic enterprises, Saxony's 
state administration was able to build Dresden into a German center for semi-conductors. 
Dresden's attraction can be explained not only by the enonnous subsidies the state 
administration was able to mobilize to this end, but also by the rich offering of highly 
skilled workers and the scientific and technical infrastructure. The April 1999 
announcement of the U.S. micro-electronic firm Mattson Technology Inc. to locate their 
European-Center for R&D in Dresden once again demonstrated the success of Dresden's 
policies for restructuring and strengthening its micro-electronic industry. 
Second, the high concentration ofbranch-specific institutions and services (university and 
other" R&D institutes, training institutions, the headquarters of the Kombinale) did not 
simply vanish after 1989. They provided human resources and sometimes even 
organizational structures for the founding and restructuring of new regional private 
organizations and public or para-public institutions. In spite of the massive collapse of 
industry-related research in East Germany after 1989, Saxony was able to maintain a 
diversified and decentralized research landscape. Saxony, together with Thuringia, make 




states.16 While the share of this personnel in Saxony and Thuringia rose between 1991 
and 1995, it continued to decline in Saxony-Anhalt and in East Berlin (Stifterverband, 
1997: 27-28). Even the dramatically shrunken textile and clothing industry was able to· 
maintain 11 small research institutes located in Saxony and Thuringia. 
The relative density of the regional service institutions also concerns various collective 
organizations. Behind the new/old capital Berlin, Saxony has more business associations 
than all other East Gennan states (some of these associations were transferred to Saxony 
and others were founded there). When one also takes into consideration the state and 
para-public institutions that developed through the transfer of institutions and the regional 
economy, then it is clear that Saxony enjoys a significant "density of actors"; according to 
district research this density is a key factor for regional networks. And so we see a variety 
of public, para-pUblic, and private institutions offering themselves as initiators, 
moderators, brokers of inter-finn cooperation and as organizers of state assistance (see for 
more details Bluhm 1999). The problem here was not a lack of "density of actors," but 
rather that these actors have to find a constructive balance between cooperation and 
competition. Although these actors are not competitors in product markets, they do 
compete with each other for political influence, legitimacy, state support and, sometimes, 
associational membership. Moreover, it is often not easy-as district literature sometimes 
assumes-to identify in which regard such actors can provide useful support. The deep 
economic and structural changes as well as the great uncertainty of the future in particular 
after 1989, made it even more difficult. Under such circumstances, the identification of 
potential common goods is already a difficult learning process. It is no wonder, that in the 
last years more projects were initiated than successfully completed (see Bluhm 1999). 
The machine industry in Chemnitz in particular has seen a number of such initiatives. The 
first was the foundation of the Interest Federation of the Chemnitz Machine Industry 
(ICM) started by the local IG Metall in April 1992. Yet, it took more than five years 
before the local industry put together promising projects. One of them was the founding 
of a research cooperation center (Kompetenzzentrum Maschinenbau). This "Center of 
Competence" was founded by ten companies in Chemnitz based on a contract for joint 
research and development of new products. This resulted in several projects and each of 
them includes a different combination of partners (Chemnitzer InnovationsWerkStadt, 
This however only amounts to about five percent of the R&D staff in Gennany's economy. A look 
at the patent applications reveals a similar picture. With 32 percent Saxony has by far the largest 
yield, followed by Thuringia with 21.5 percent, Brandenburg with 13.7 percent, Berlin (East) 13.5 
percent, Saxony-Anhalt 12.8 percent and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania with 6.6. percent. The 
filing average is 21 patent applications per 100,000 inhabitants, the German average as a whole 
was 58 percent in 1998 (www.deutsches-patentamt.de.Jahresbericht 1998). 
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1998: 11). Though the "Center of Competence" was initiated by a few companies, the 
idea received early financal support from the state government of Saxony and got 
institutional support by the Economic Development Corporation of the city of Chemnitz 
(see Bluhm, 1999: 166-170). 
Third, part of the legacy of the decentral regional order is the identification of certain 
industry (not one single large firm but a number of smaller firms) with the region or sub­
region in which they are located. This kind of regional-based identity also facilitates 
cooperation since it is easier to create and recognize joint interests and potential common 
goods. Sometimes, this identification is so strong that even trademarks are not firm-based 
but regional-based. One example is the Plauener lace and embroidery industry in and 
around the town ofPiau en. In the state socialist system this traditional small- and medium 
sized industry was organized within one large but highly dispersed VEB. After a period 
of dissolution, separation and deep mistrust the firms learned that they have a common 
good to protect, namely the regional-based trademark "Plauener Lace." They founded a 
trademark association in order to protect the regional manufacturer's use of the tradename 
and to determine and monitor quality standards. Based on this agreement further 
initiatives became possible. The most advanced of these was the expansion of the market 
for "Plauener Lace" beyond household textiles (as it was under state socialist conditions) 
to undergarments and clothes and to present the "umbrella trademark" at international 
exhibitions. These expansion efforts were monitored by the employer's association of the 
East German textile and clothing industry, located in Chemnitz, and financially supported 
by the para-public Economic Development Corporation of the state ofSaxony. 
The old regional-based brand products like the IIPlauener Lace" or Vogtland's Music 
Instruments provide a model for cooperation. The textile association and Saxony's 
Economic Development Corp. have begun to encourage other very small firms in Saxony 
to create "umbrella trademarks" even though these firms have not had a traditionally a 
regional-based trademark. Up to 1999, 18 such joint marketing associations were founded 
including 650 companies and more than 8,000 employees. The aim is mainly the same, 
namely he pooling of resources to ensure a uniform market presence and enhance the 
degree of brand recognition, while firms maintain their own individuality. The bargaining 
process between the firms is monitored and moderated either by the textile association or 




I have argued, that the East German enterprise transformation can only be understood 
when one combines both top-down and bottom-up perspectives. In this respect, East 
Germany is no different than other Central- and Eastern Europe cases where the necessity 
of a combined view is widely accepted. Integrating the bottom-up perspective also reveals 
that the insitutional pathway approach explains the East German case less than Stark and 
Bruszt suggested. In addition, a closer look at this case identifies two more general 
weaknesses ofthe pathway approach: 
First, the institutional pathway approach did, in fact, ignore the possibility of institutional 
decay and dissolution. Thus, this approach assumes as a constant in all transformation 
processes that institutional resources are to be recombined and rearranged, and that 
through this the socialist past reaches into the post-socialist present and future. While the 
concept of the "shock therapi' is "undersocialized," the pathway approach 
"oversocialized" the behavior ofactors in a way that does not focus closely enough on the 
different constraints and opportunities for strategic choices of actors. There is enough 
evidence, for instance, for Poland or the Czech Republic that autonomization was a 
relevant option for enterprise managers during the transformation. J7 Gerald A. 
McDermott shows for the Czech Republic after 1988/89 that some conglomerates stuck 
together, while others almost immediately fell appart (McDermott 1998). He also gives 
impressive illustrations that an autonomization-strategy under the conditions of an 
"emerging market" was highly risky. "Renegades," when they gave up their membership 
in a large enterprise, were, especially in the early stage of transition, in danger of losing 
access to government or bank credit and to their former suppliers that could hardly be 
replaced (see McDermott 1994, 1998).18 Such special benefits and risks did not exist in 
the Geman case. 
Second, the institutional pathway approach also over- and underestimates the role of 
historical legacies. These legacies are overestimated as the institutional arrangements of 
17 	 In addition, there are the processes of "spontaneous privatization" and "asset stripping," generally 
carried out by management in the earlier phases of the transition (compare Mertlik, 1996: 
MacDermott 1994; 27; Ga~jarz,lPaiik6w, 1996; TanzlerlMazalkova, 1996; Domisch. 1999: 
Urban, 1997: 187; Ernst et al., 1996: 295; BeyerIWielgohs, 1998). 
18 	 Ernst et aI. also show with Poland, that in the earlier years there were considerably more small, 
independent entexprises than large fmns that had to offiCially declare bankruptcy, The average 
size of the flIm. that was actually liquidated by .IPid-1994 was about 41 employe~ (1996: 109), 
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significant part of this process. The creation of new enterprises and the reconfiguration of 
enterprise units were intertwined processes in which resources and assets were 
transferred. These processes could scarcely be disentangled from each other. Though 
there was not much asset stripping in East Gennany, many managers, engineers and 
qualified workers tried to create a new professional existence by applying previously 
accumulated social and intellectual capital and also often purchased machinery and 
technical equipment from their fonner workplace. Even product ideas and key 
technologies from these new enterprises often had their origins in former work contexts 
and experiences. J3 It is important to distinguish between the 1994 statistics that describe 
the outcomes of the Treuhand privatization and the results of enterprise transformation in 
general. While the Treuhand statistics show a clear dominance of western, especially of 
West Gennan owners (Table 1), surveys reveal another picture. According to the 
Economic Institute in Halle (IWH) it is East Gennan owned property that dominates East 
Gennan industry, with the exception of the chemical industry (1998: 14). As Table 2 
shows, in 1996,86 percent of industrial finns were in East Gennan ownership, and only 
ten percent of these finns were privatized or reprivatized by the THA The German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) came up with similar results, and their survey 
showed that independent finns and not subsidiaries were the dominant form of enterprises 
in East Germany as of 1998. The proportion of East German owners appears to be high 
among these firms (Table 3), though we also have to consider that with regard to the 
employment and business volume the share of East Gennan firms is clearly lower (see 
Table 2). According to the IWH (Table 2), East Gennan owners employ 58 percent of the 
employees working in manufacturing industries, whereas West German owners employ 
about 31 percent of such workers. 
In addition, even when we include West German and foreign-owned property the average 
size of industrial finns in East Germany is far below the average size in comparable West 
One example: With the corporatization of the former R&D Center of the "Fritz-Heckert" 
Kombinat as a separate fIrm. it became a company to be privatized by the THA just like other 
corporatized enterprises. The TIIA-supported by the management-soon found an investor for 
the Center who agreed to take over 160 employees of the Center (l,600 people had been 
employed in 1989). But even before that, the R&D Center lost many employees in other ways. A 
considerable number sought new jobs in West Germany or in the restructured regional or city 
administrations. Yet, a lot of engineers left the Center in order to create-with their know how 
and colleagues-their own enterprises. In some cases they developed and commercialized new 
ideas or technologies which stemmed from their time with the Center. We do not know exactly 
how many start-ups can be traced to such resources and uses of social capital. But in this case, one 
can say the Treuhand privatization of this R&D Center failed, and after a long decline it finally 
went bankrupt in 1996. Still, at least three or four of those new start-ups survived. In the end, only 




German industries-we see a so-called "scaling-down of enterprises," or a Verkleinbe­
trieblichung. In 1998, the average size of mining and manufacturing enterprises in 
Saxony lies around 80 employees, in Saxony-Anhalt around 115, while in West Gennan 
Lander like Baden-Wiirttemberg it lies around 140 and in Nord Rhine-Westphalia around 
145 employees (see Table 4).14 To summarize, East Germany's enterprise transfonnation 
resulted not primarily in the creation ofwestern subsidiaries. In fact, we find a mixture of 
some western enterprises, mostly larger than indigenous firms, and many small and 
independent East German manufacturing companies. These companies often attempt to 
survive in specialized niches and operate with minimal capital and profit. Thus, the 
structure of the East German industry can be characterized as a kind of "small business 
capitalism. " 
Based on these findings, the difficulties faced with respect to regional and associational 
networks are quite different from what Stark and Bruszt suggested. Regional networks 
and associational ties were not impossible because of the dominance of western 
subsidiaries. However, due to the radical dissolution of former iJiter-organizational 
relationships these networks had to be extensively reconstituted, and this is a long and 
difficult process. IS Moreover, the reconstitution of regional networks and associational 
ties has varied among East German regions, and a clear North-South divide is emerging. 
Brandenburg's industry. for example, is characterized by a fragmentation of endogenous 
potentials and little regional networking. This situation is attributed to the vertical 
integration of key area enterprises into West German companies whose headquarters and 
R&D capacities are mostly located outside of the region (Schwarz, 1999). In Saxony­
Anhalt the privatization of the huge chemical enterprises was only possible with an active 
industrial policy and state subsidies, that Helmut Kohl's government agreed to fearing 
both the high work force concentration in the "Chemical-Triangel" and pressure from the 
trade union. The relatively good ranking of Saxony-Anhalt in respect to investments (see 
Table 4 and 5) can be traced back to the huge investments in a few chemical plants that, 
in fact, have little use for regional suppliers or research capacities. Meanwhile, in Saxony 
with respect to R&D, some researchers even see a higher level of regional cooperation 
than in comparable regions of West Germany (FritschILukas, 1998), and there continues 
to be many initiatives to develop cooperation among firms (see Bluhm 1999). 
See also Lutz 1996: 125. Schmidt. 1996. 
1$ 	 In 1997 the DIW found that the supply routes for East German producers were still on average 
longer than those of producers in West Gennany (1997: 599). 
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the particular state-socialist economy are always identified as foundations of a "post­
socialist pathway" after 1989 without adequately considering the institutional breaks. The 
institutional pathway approach at the same time underestimates the influence of historical 
legacies by highlighting the state-socialist starting point above all other historical factors, 
especially of the more distant past. With the German example I showed that even with its 
massive institutional and structural breaks, there were older histories of industrial order 
before the time of the state-socialist production and governance system, that have 





Ownership structures of enterprises in the THA portfolio after September 30, 1994. 

Portfolio of enterprises Portfolio of 
enterprises 
OwnershipActivity Number % Number % 
Status 
3.718 31Liquidized -
Municipalities310 2 310 4 
municipalities 
Was taken over by 
Former owners 1.588 13 1.588 19 
Privatized 
Reprivatized 
6.546 54 MBOIMBI 2.983 35 
West German 2.703 32 
investors 
Foreign 860 10investors 
I 
8.444 100 
Remaining with 1HA 
12.162 100 TotalTotal net 
192 Remaining with 192 
I1HATotal gross 12.354 
I 
Sources: Bundesanstalt fUr vereinigte Sonderaufgaben: AbschluJ3statistik, IWH (1998). 
TABLE 2 

Ownership structure 199511996 in the East German industry (%), according IWH. 

\Owners Enterprises Employment Business Volume Common Stock 
Capital 
East Germans 86 58 42 22-29 
West Germans 12 31 41 5144 
, Foreign Investors 1 6 11 7 
Public ownership I 5 6 20 
Total 100 100 100 100 




Enterprises and employment in the East German industry regarding ownership structure and 
origin, 1991 until 1998 (%), according DIW. 
Enterprises (%) Employment (%) 
QuarterNear Sommer Sommer Winter Spring Fall Begin S S W Sp F 




Private 14 66 94 99 99, 100 8 41 76 95 95 
Enterprises 
including: 9 49 80 77 77 76 1 19 42 50 5] 
Independent 
Enterprises 






Privatized Xl 48* 41 34 33 26 Xl 36* 55 60 57 
Enterprises 
Reprivatized Xl 20 17 13 13 Xl 8 13 10 
Enterprises, Xl 5 7 5 8 8 Xl 2 5 2 6 




Start-ups Xl 13 26 43 44 53 Xl 3 7 20 22 
after 1989 


















Xl) Numbers are not available, or insignificant, due to a small number of cases. *) Included reprivatized 
enterprises. 
Source: DIW 1998: 585. 
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TABLE 4 
Structural data on mining and manufacturing in the 16 German Lander (patent application 








Number 1000 Mill. DM MiII.DM Mill. DM per 100.000 
Inhabitants 
1998 1998 1998 1998 1997 1998 




Bavaria 8294 1189 413018 154009 16070 97 
Berlin 950 121 59304 12276 2153 40 
Brandenburg 1116 93 27463 4014 2636 17 
Bremen 355 66 33488 15974 627 25 
Hamburg 602 103 94722 15853 2571 52 
Hesse 3257 470 154059 51429 8146 69 
Mecklenburg­ 556 44 12169 1808 725 12 
WestPom. 
Lower Saxony 4215 560 235214 84779 8925 38 
North Rhine­ 10429 1520 527934 168818 18266 94 
Westphalia 
Rhineland­ 2276 312 113755 46512 3932 52 
Palatinate 
Saarland 527 107 31556 11230 1166 27 
Saxony 2656 211 52510 11693 3875 23 
Saxony-Anhalt 1262 103 29660 4010 4261 15 
Schleswig­ 1483 143 50678 15083 1413 24 
Holstein 
Thuringia 1531 117 29886 5654 1522 28 
Source: Statistische Bundesanstalt, Jahrbuch 1998, www.statistik-bund.de (pnly enterprises with more 





Ranking of the mining and manufacturing industries in the 16 Gennan Lander according to 
structural data (patent applications rankings reflect all sectors of the economy) 
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